Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy by Alasdair Smith
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy
Volume Author/Editor: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-45460-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/krug94-1
Conference Date: October 13-14, 1989
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market
Chapter Author: Alasdair Smith
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8676
Chapter pages in book: (p. 67 - 84)3  Strategic Trade Policy in the 
European Car Market 
Alasdair Smith 
3.1  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to study the role of “strategic trade policy” in the 
European car market. This work derives from earlier partial-equilibrium mod- 
eling of trade policy in imperfectly competitive industries (Venables and Smith 
1986; Smith and Venables 1988). 
This is the third of  a series of papers that adapts the earlier model to take 
account of the quantitative restrictions on imports in the European car market 
and allows not only for the effect on prices of such restrictions but also for the 
effect on the behavior of imperfectly competitive firms. The model is numeri- 
cally calibrated to data on the European car market in 1988. 
This model of the car market was used by  Smith and Venables (1991) to 
study the ranking of policy instruments and to illustrate the interaction between 
quantitative restrictions and imperfect competition. The detailed implications 
of the model for the effects on likely policy changes in the European car mar- 
ket were discussed by Smith (1990). 
These two earlier papers treated the industry as one with a given number of 
firms  each of which produced a fixed number of different models of cars. Here 
I treat as endogenous the number of models produced by a firm.  Then the trade 
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policy of one country  (or one group of countries)  can affect the number  of 
models produced by firms located in other countries, and this in turn affects 
the outcome of competition between firms. This is one way  of  capturing the 
essential idea of strategic trade policy, in the sense of policy which changes 
the relative competitive strengths of home and foreign firms. 
I investigate whether the nature of the strategic policy effects are sensitive 
to the specification of the model, and find that they are, and whether strategic 
policy effects are strong enough to overturn “conventional” wisdom about the 
welfare effects of trade policy, and find that they are not. 
3.2  The Model 
The formal model is fully presented by Smith (1990) and Smith and Ven- 
ables (1991). The principal features are described below, but detailed deriva- 
tions are not given. There is an imperfectly  competitive  industry producing 
differentiated products. Firms, which each produce several different models of 
car, see the demand for their products as depending on the price of the individ- 
ual model and also on the overall price of cars. The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) repre- 
sentation of consumer choice in markets with differentiated products allows us 
to write the demand per model in marketj  for cars produced by firm i as 
where ul,  and b, are shift parameters describing the size of the market, p,, is the 
price in market j of a model of car produced by firm  i, and q, is an aggregate 
price  index  for cars in  market j (and  is a  constant  elasticity  function  of 
the pricespq of all models sold). Then E is the elasticity of demand with respect 
to the relative price of the individual model of car reflecting the extent to which 
there is substitutability in demand between different product varieties, while p 
is the aggregate elasticity of demand for cars. 
The Dixit-Stiglitz  formulation is convenient as it gives rise to a demand 
function in which demand is a constant elasticity function of two prices. It is 
based on the assumption that each individual consumer chooses to buy some 
of each of the products on the market. This is not as appealing a description of 
consumer choice of cars as the Lancaster  (1  979) approach, in which the con- 
sumer chooses one product  whose price  and characteristics  come closest to 
that consumer’s needs, Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1989) have presented 
conditions under which the Dixit-Stiglitz model describes the behavior of the 
aggregate market, even if individual consumers’ behavior is described by the 
Lancaster approach. 
Competition between firms is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage 
of the game, firms choose model numbers, taking account of the effect of their 
choices on the second-stage equilibrium, and the outcome is a Nash equilib- 
rium in model numbers. 
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titative restrictions on imports) in output, given model numbers. Firms max- 
imize profits, taking account of the impact of scale economies on marginal 
costs, of the effect of taxes, tariffs, and transport costs on the wedge between 
producer  and consumer prices, and of  the effect of elasticity of  demand in 
different markets on their marginal revenues. National markets are assumed to 
be segmented, so that firms can set different prices in different markets.  A 
producer with a large market share in a particular national market sees its own 
behavior as having a strong influence on the overall price of cars in that market 
and thus perceives a relatively inelastic demand for its product; this leads such 
firms to have higher price-cost margins. Specifically, the first-order condition 
for a firm selling in a market in which there are no quantitative restrictions on 
sales is the standard equation of marginal revenue and marginal cost, 
where P,~T,  is the producer price and mc, is the firm’s marginal cost. The term 
Ue,,,  the firm’s perceived inverse demand elasticity, is a weighted average of the 
inverses of the two demand elasticities which appear in the demand function: 
(3)  l/eo = (1/~)(  1 -  s,,)  + (l/p.)~,~, 
where the weight sl,  is firm i’s share in value terms of market j.  This relation 
has the appealing feature of  making firms perceive a less elastic demand for 
their product the larger their market share. A firm with a small market share 
takes  almost no account  of the  elasticity of  the aggregate market  demand, 
while, at the other extreme, a monopoly perceives only the.aggregate demand 
elasticity. 
The model allows there to be a “voluntary” export restraint  (VER) which 
limits the share that firms from one country may have in a particular national 
market (as Japanese firms are currently restricted in several European national 
markets. The model can alternatively  allow there to be a restriction  on the 
firms’ overall market share in a group of national markets as a whole, as Japa- 
nese firms are in the near future to be restricted to a fixed share of the aggregate 
EC market). 
Firms in markets that are not subject to sales restrictions are assumed to 
behave as Coumot competitors, and equations (2)  and (3) apply. This assump- 
tion is also made about the behavior of  the restricted firms in markets with 
sales restrictions. Where other firms are subject to restrictions on their market 
shares, however, an unrestricted firm is assumed to take account of the effect 
that a change in its sales will have on the sales of restricted firms. The effect 
of  the  share restriction  on  firms’  behavior, derived  in  Smith and  Venables 
(1991), is to replace in equation (3) above the unrestricted firm’s actual value 
market share so with the larger expression 
(4) 
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where nr is the number of (equal-sized) firms subject to sales restraint in mar- 
ketj  and sv the value market share of each, m,  the number of models produced 
by firm i, and R the set of restricted firms. Thus the second term in (4) is the 
product of the value market share of the restricted firms and the volume share 
taken by firm i of  the sales of all the unrestricted firms. Clearly, firm i behaves 
as if its market share is larger than it actually is and perceives a more inelastic 
demand than it would in the absence of the VER. An extreme case is where all 
firms but firm i are subject to VERs, when (4) reduces to S,,  = 1. Because all 
other firms are constrained to fixed market shares, firm i can and will choose 
the perfectly collusive outcome. In the general case, the anticompetitive effect 
of  the VER is less strong but still leads firms to set higher price-cost margins 
than they would in the absence of the VER. 
Firms’ cost functions are assumed to take the form 
where x  is output per model, and rn is the number of models. The values of the 
parameters c,,  c2,  and cc are permitted to vary between firms, but c,  is assumed 
to be a positive number less than unity and constant across firms. This function 
displays economies of scale in two dimensions: defining variable cost as the 
element in cost which varies with output per model, average variable cost is a 
decreasing function of output per model, while the fixed cost per model is a 
decreasing function of the number of models. 
The model  is solved backwards:  a solution for the second-stage game is 
derived from given model numbers, as described above, and then a Nash equi- 
librium in model numbers is found, taking into account the effects of model 
number choices on the second-stage equilibrium. An analytical description of 
the determination of model numbers has not been derived: the equilibrium is 
found numerically. 
3.3  Data and Model Calibration 
The model is calibrated to data for the world car market in 1988. The world 
is divided into eight markets: France, West Germany, Italy, the United King- 
dom, Iberia (Spain and Portugal), the rest of the European Community (RoEC; 
an aggregation of Benelux, Ireland, Greece, and Denmark), EFTA, and the rest 
of the world (ROW).  This level of country disaggregation is needed in order to 
model the differences in trade policy in  1988 between different members of 
the European Community and to allow for the fact that the Iberian countries 
were still in the process of harmonizing  their trade policy with the common 
external tariff of the Community. 
The producers  are divided into eight groups: French (two producers, Peu- 
geot and Renault), Volkswagen (VW), Fiat, Rover, the U.S. multinationals in 
Europe (Ford and General Motors [GM] in Europe, who are treated as entirely 
independent of their American parents), the “specialist” producers (Mercedes, 71  Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market 
BMW, Volvo, Saab, Jaguar, and Porsche), the Japanese, and the rest of  the 
world (who are mainly the North American producers). This level of producer 
disaggregation allows the model to capture the strong differences which exist 
in national sales patterns. Within each group, firms are assumed to be identical. 
In the case of the French and the Americans in Europe, this is very close to 
reality: in each pair the firms are of roughly equal size and have similar sales 
patterns. The specialists and the Japanese are more heterogenous; calculation 
of Herfindahl indices suggests it is appropriate to assume the existence of three 
equal-sized specialist manufacturers and four equal-sized Japanese firms. 
Table 3.  I summarizes the shape of the European car market in 1988. The top 
two sections of the table show sales in the eight markets and the distribution of 
those sales by producer group, based on registration data in the Automotive 
Industry Data 1989 Car Yearbook (1990). Both the rest of  the world market 
and the sales in Europe by non-Japanese non-European producers-(Other  (N) 
in table 3.1)-are  included only to close the model and no attention has been 
given to accurate modeling of  the non-European  markets. Therefore, in the 
discussion of the effects of policy changes, the effects both on “other” produc- 
ers and in the rest of the world market are ignored. There is no attempt to 
explain in this paper the model-number choices of Rover or the European “spe- 
cialist” producers (so they do not enjoy “strategic” policy effects), and they are 
aggregated in tables as Other (E) even though  they are treated  as separate 
groups in the numerical modeling. 
The shares of Japanese producers in the different markets display the effects 
of trade restrictions. In our base year of  1988, there were restrictions on im- 
ports from Japan to France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. 
Since 1977, Japanese imports were restricted to 3 percent of the French market 
Table 3.1  The European Car Market, 1988 
United 
France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom  RoEC  Iberia  EFTA  ROW 
Market sales total (million) cars 
Market shares (%): 
2.2  2.8 
French  63.2  6.7 
vw  8.6  29.4 
Fiat  7.2  4.7 
FordGM  11.3  25.4 
Japanese  3.0  15.2 
Other (E)  5.5  17.9 
Total  100.0  100.0 
26.2  28.9 
Other (N)  1.3  0.8 
Estimated sales value (billion ECU) 
2.2  2.2  1.1  1.3  1.2  17.2 
14.8  12.6  18.3  38.0  9.3  2.6 
11.7  5.9  13.0  17.5  14.2  1.6 
59.9  3.7  5.3  9.7  5.2  0.0 
6.9  40.1  22.5  26.9  19.2  0.6 
0.9  11.4  26.6  2.1  31.9  39.0 
4.5  22.9  9.6  5.2  17.7  2.8 
1.2  3.4  4.6  0.6  2.5  53.4 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
25.2  25.3  17.1  16.2 
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and  11 percent  of the U.K. market.  (The  11.4 percent Japanese share of the 
U.K. market shown in table 3.1 includes a small number  of  U.K.-produced 
cars, but in the model all “Japanese” cars are treated as imports.) Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal have long-standing and tight limits on Japanese imports. Both the 
Italian and Iberian restrictions are modeled, like the French and U.K. restric- 
tions, as limiting Japanese market shares. This is not strictly accurate, but the 
levels to which Japanese imports are restricted in these markets are so low that 
the distinction between levels and shares is of little significance. In other EC 
markets (including Germany) there are no explicit restraints on Japanese sales, 
and we have assumed no VERs in Germany or the RoEC. 
Calibration of the model to this data requires assumptions about cost and 
demand elasticities and about taxes, tariffs, and transport costs. As in the previ- 
ous work with this model, a value of 1.5 is chosen for p,,  the aggregate industry 
elasticity of  demand, and a value of  4 for E, the elasticity of  demand for an 
individual model of car. For justification of these elasticity choices and further 
details on taxes, tariffs, and transport costs, see Smith (1990). 
In earlier work (Venables and Smith 1986; Smith and Venables 1988), varia- 
tion in numbers of  models per firm was used as a device to account for the 
difference in the scale of different firms. In the case of the car industry, how- 
ever, it is possible to give a concrete interpretation. The Ludvigsen study for 
the European Commission (Ludvigsen Associates Limited  1988) centered its 
description of  scale economies on the concept of  a “platform,” essentially a 
floor plan on which a family of cars can be based. The Ludvigsen information 
on the numbers of platforms per producer gives the model numbers shown in 
table 3.2 (where, however, the model numbers for Japanese producers are sim- 
ply assumed). Ludvigsen provides information about the relation between vari- 
able costs and scale and output per platform that suggests that average variable 
cost declines by 5 percent for every doubling of output per platform, and this 
property is satisfied by choosing c, =  0.925 for all firms. Ludvigsen provides 
much sketchier information about fixed costs, and the rest of the parameters of 
the cost function are calibrated in a way described below. 
Ludvigsen also provides some information on the prices of cars of different 
types in different markets. German market prices are used as the base for cali- 
brating prices, on the grounds that, of the markets for which Ludvigsen pro- 
vides price data, this is the least distorted by taxes and protection. Assuming 
Table 3.2  The European Car Market, 1988: Production and Sales 
~~  ~ 
Sales  Models  Firm  Sales per Model 
(million)  per Finn  Numbers  (thousand) 
French  3.443  7  2 
vw  2.205  7  1 
Fiat  1.929  6  1 
FordGM  2.935  5  2 
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that the distribution of cars of different types (utility, small, lower-medium, 
etc.) in each firm’s output is the same as in the firm’s German  sales gives a 
price for each producer group’s “typical” car in Germany, then a price in each 
of the other markets is derived from the model. These prices are reflected in 
the estimated sales values reported in the third section of table 3.1. 
The calibration  of  the model  then consists  of  the choice of  firm-specific 
marginal cost parameters c3  to reproduce the German prices and, in the absence 
of VERs, the choice of parameters to scale the demand functions to observed 
sales, that is to say, to explain the pattern of sales displayed in table 3.1. How- 
ever, in markets  where VERs are in operation  we  have no observations  on 
Japanese market shares in the absence of constraints and therefore infer these 
demand parameters from information about unrestricted markets, as described 
in detail in Smith (1990). 
Finally, the parameters c, are calibrated to make the actual model numbers 
shown  in  table  3.2  optimal for  the  French,  German,  Italian,  “American- 
European,” and Japanese producers. (The peculiar features or the lack of infor- 
mation about the other producers made it unreasonable to assume that model 
numbers were chosen by these firms in the same way as by the mass-market 
producers.) For each producer a range of possible values of c2 was found by 
simulating new equilibria in which that producer had one more and one fewer 
model than in the base case and calculating the values of the cost parameter 
consistent with the base case being optimal. (In all cases, the profit function 
was locally concave in model numbers, so the base could be calibrated as an 
optimum.) 
The results of this calibration do not allow the choice of the same value of 
c, for all firms (nor do they allow c2 to be chosen proportionally to the firm- 
specific marginal cost factors CJ.  However, from the ranges of values compati- 
ble with the base it was possible to choose values implying a cost of 400 mil- 
lion ECU per year per model for French and Japanese producers and of 475 
million ECU per year for all others. For all firms but the Japanese these param- 
eters imply that the cost associated with model numbers (c,m) are in the range 
of 26-28  percent of variable cost, and this ratio is not inconsistent  with the 
vague information  given by  Ludvigsen  on these  matters.  (For the Japanese 
firms, the proportion is 18.5 percent.) There is, of course, an element of arbi- 
trariness about these choices, and the implications of this arbitrariness are ex- 
plored below. 
The values of c,  play no role in the policy simulations below, since changes 
in firm numbers are not considered. If such changes were permitted, it would 
be natural to choose c,  to make the base a zero-profit free-entry equilibrium. 
3.4  VERs as a Strategic Trade Policy for the European Community 
In this section, 1 address the question of whether the national VERs on Japa- 
nese imports can be seen, from the viewpoint of the European Community as 
a whole, as an effective strategic trade policy. Table 3.3  National VERs, Model Numbers Fixed 
United  EC 
France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom  RoEC  Iberia  Total  EFTA 
Japanese market shares 
Initial 
Final 




Welfare changes (million 
19.1  20.4  21.5  22.2  34.1  16.1  21.5 
3.0  19.4  0.9  11.4  32.7  2.1  10.9 
-2,345.2  32.0  -3,873.2  -1,446.4  -16.0  -1,276.8  -8,925.6  -14.1 
-256.5  1.9  -322.7  -144.7  -2.9  -179.1  -904.0  -1.2 
6.4  0.0  8.9  10.3  0.3  26.9  52.8  0.0 
EC 
French  VW  Fiat  FordGM  Other(E)  Total”  Japanese 
Profits 
Totalb 
Total (excluding tax)’ 
1,271.2  354.9  1,315.4  564.2  379.5  3,603.1  -  1,529.6 
-6,173.1 
-5,269.1 
“Equals sum of profits for French, VW, Fiat, and Other(E) plus one-half of  profits for FordGM. 
bEquals sum of  EC total consumer surplus, tax revenue, CET revenue, and profits. 
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Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the effects of  the restraints on Japanese imports 
under alternative  assumptions about variation in firms’ model numbers. The 
base case on which the model is calibrated is one with import restrictions in 
place in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Iberia. However, for exposi- 
tional convenience the tables present the simulation results as the imposition 
of such restrictions. Table 3.4 shows the effects of moving from the simulated 
equilibrium with no import restrictions back to the base equilibrium with im- 
port restrictions. Table 3.3 shows the same change but with firms’ model num- 
bers fixed at the level of the no-restriction  simulation. Thus table 3.3 has no 
“strategic trade policy” effects. 
The dramatic reductions in the market share of Japanese producers in table 
3.3 are associated with large reductions in Japanese sales and associated price 
increases in the restricted markets. Non-Japanese firms raise their prices a little 
as their market power  increases. In the  unrestricted  markets there  are only 
small redistributions of market share, as Japanese firms’ marginal costs rise a 
little and non-Japanese firms’ marginal costs and prices fall a little. The effects 
on firms’ profits and on consumer surplus are shown in the lower part of table 
3.3: large reductions in consumer surplus in the restricted  markets, large in- 
creases in the profits of European producers, especially those with large mar- 
ket shares in the most restricted markets. There are also changes in tax revenue 
(which are separately shown in the table as sales tax revenue and revenue from 
the common external tariff [CET] of the European Community). 
There are  ambiguities  in  the  summation  of  the  welfare  effects  of  these 
changes. The multinationality of production makes it undesirable to count, say, 
the profits, of  Peugeot and Renault as gains to France, since some of these 
profits may go to workers and managers in Spain and the United Kingdom. At 
the level of the European Community as a whole, however, this problem exists 
only for Ford and GM. Arbitrarily, I count half of their profit change as accru- 
ing to the European Community. Whether tax revenue should be counted as a 
gain depends on whether one sees the taxes as creating or correcting distor- 
tions, but we can ignore this problem since the treatment of tax revenue never 
makes a qualitative difference to results. 
In brief, table 3.3 shows the welfare losses to European consumers from the 
import restrictions greatly outweighing the welfare gains to European produc- 
ers. There are also negative effects on Japanese profits. The results are derived 
in a model in which imperfect competition is given a key role, and the implica- 
tions of the interaction between imperfect competition and quantitative import 
restrictions are spelled out in Smith and Venables (1991), but the general shape 
of the results is not dissimilar to those that would be derived in a conventional 
model of  perfect competition. 
Table 3.4 incorporates strategic effects. The imposition of the VERs leads 
to an increase in model numbers by one each by the two French producers, 
the two “American-European’’ producers, and VW, while each of the Japanese 
producers reduces its model numbers by two. There is a marked effect on con- Table 3.4  National VERs, Model Numbers Variable 
United  EC 
France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom  RoEC  Iberia  Total  EFTA 
Japanese market shares 
Initial 
Final 




Welfare changes (million 
19.1  20.4  21.5  22.2  34.1  16.1  21.5 
3.0  15.2  0.9  11.4  26.6  2.1  9.3 
-  1,399.4  241.9  -3,340.8  -717.0  -90.9  -662.9  -5,969.1  -132.3 
-153.1  14.8  -278.4  -71.7  -16.2  -93.0  -597.6  -11.0 
3.9  -0.3  7.6  5.4  1.2  14.1  31.9  0.0 
Profits 
Totalb 
Total (excluding tax) 
EC 
French  VW  Fiat  Ford/GM  Other(E)  Total'  Japanese 
996.4  323.1  1,077.0  444.6  308.9  2,927.7  -  1,655.8 
-  3,607.1 
-  3,009.5 
"Equals sum of  profits for French, VW, Fiat, and Other(E) plus one-half of  profits for FordGM. 
bEquals  sum of EC total consumer surplus, tax revenue, CET revenue, and profits. 
<Equals  sum of EC total consumer surplus, CET revenue, and profits. 77  Strategic Trade Policy in  the European Car Market 
sumer welfare:  the increase in model variety combined with price increases 
that are generally lower than when model numbers are fixed reduces the loss 
in consumer welfare to 6,000 million  ECU per year in table 3.4, compared 
with 9,000 million in table 3.3. However, not only is this loss still in excess of 
the gains to European  producers, the producers’ gains are actually lower in 
table 3.4 than in table 3.3. The VERs are counterproductive as a strategic trade 
policy in shifting profits toward European producers. 
The reason for this is easy to see. The change in model numbers is optimal 
for each individual producer, taking the other producers’ model numbers as 
given, but the change in all producers’ model numbers is profit-reducing,  as 
intensified competition among European producers more than outweighs the 
beneficial effects of the reduction in Japanese competition. This is an example 
of the problem identified by Dixit (1984) of the weakening of the strategic case 
for import restrictions as the number of “home” firms increases. 
When we look at policy from an EC point of view it might seem more natu- 
ral to look at an EC-wide strategic trade policy rather than the EC-wide effects 
of  national trade  policies. I have shown results  for the latter in this  section 
because the national  trade policies are the actual policies currently  in place, 
but policy simulations for an EC-wide VER have been carried out. There are 
significant differences in the cross-country distribution of effects: EC-wide re- 
strictions impose larger costs on consumers in markets unaffected by present 
national restrictions and lower costs on consumers in markets where tight na- 
tional restrictions are replaced by a looser EC-wide restriction, and they give 
greater benefits to producers whose output is spread across the EC markets and 
less to those whose sales are concentrated in the presently restricted national 
markets. However, at the EC level the welfare results are remarkably similar 
to those reported in tables 3.3 and 3.4, so the details are not reported here. 
3.5  A National VER as Strategic Trade Policy 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 explore the effectiveness of a VER for a single country, 
France. As in the previous section, the tables present the results in the form of 
the effects of the imposition of the VER. Table 3.5 shows the effects of impos- 
ing a VER on Japanese imports into France, with other national VERs in place 
and  with producers’  model  numbers  fixed at the equilibrium  level with  no 
French VER. Table 3.6 looks at the same policy experiment, but now with 
producers’ model numbers variable (so that the endpoint of the policy experi- 
ment, as in table 3.4, is the base on which the model was calibrated). 
Table 3.5 shows the French VER imposing costs on consumers greatly in 
excess of the gains to French producers, indeed greatly in excess of the gains 
to all European producers. Table 3.6 introduces the strategic effects: the impo- 
sition of the French VER has the effect of reducing Japanese model numbers 
by one per producer and raising VW’s model numbers by one. 
It is a little surprising that the producer which expands its model range as a Table 3.5  French VER, Model Numbers Fixed 
United  EC 
France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom  RoEC  Iberia  Total  EFTA 
Japanese market shares 
Initial 
Final 
Welfare changes (million 
ECU per year) 
Consumer surplus 
Tax  revenue 
CET revenue 
16.0  17.3  0.9  11.4  29.6  2.1  12.5 
3.0  17.1  0.9  11.4  29.2  2.1  10.0 
-2,002.9  4.5  29.9  29.8  -4.6  21.5  -1,921.8  -4.4 
-219.1  0.3  2.5  3.0  -0.8  3.0  -211.1  -0.4 
5.1  0.1  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  4.8  0.0 
Ford  EC 
French  VW  Fiat  GM  Other(E)  Total”  Japanese 
Profits  660.2  57.0  45.2  84.4  53.1  857.7  -315.2 
Totalb 
Total (excluding tax)’ 
-  1,270.4 
-  1,059.3 
”Equals sum of  profits for French, VW, Fiat, and Other(E) plus one-half of  profits for FordGM. 
bEquals sum of EC total consumer surplus, tax revenue, CET revenue, and profits. 
‘Equals sum of EC total consumer surplus, CET revenue, and profits. Table 3.6  French VER, Model Numbers Variable 
United  EC 
France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom  RoEC  Iberia  Total  EFTA 
Japanese market shares 
Initial  16.0  17.3  0.9  11.4  29.6  2.1  12.5 
Final  3.0  15.2  0.9  11.4  26.6  2.1  9.3 
Welfare changes (million 
ECU per year) 
Consumer surplus  -1,898.6  16.7  196.7  64.5  -162.8  130.0  -1,653.5  -121.6 
Tax revenue  -207.7  1.0  16.4  6.5  -28.9  18.2  -194.5  -10.1 
CET revenue  5.0  0.1  -0.4  -0.1  1.4  -1.9  4.1  0.0 
EC 
French  VW  Fiat  Ford/GM  Other(E)  Total"  Japanese 
Profits  641.6  147.5  -9.4  86.2  113.4  936.2  -365.8 
Totalb  -907.7 
Total (excluding tax)'  -713.2 
%quais sum of profits for French, VW, Fiat, and Other(E) plus one-half of profits for Ford/GM. 
bEquals sum of EC total consumer surplus, tax revenue, CET revenue, and profits. 
cEquals sum of EC total consumer surplus, CET revenue, and profits. 80  Alasdair Smith 
result of the French VER should be a German producer rather than a French 
producer, but given the levels of the parameter c2  chosen in the calibration, this 
turns out to be the (unique) equilibrium. 
The first point to be made, then, is that there is no guarantee in a many- 
country world that the benefits of a strategic trade policy imposed by one coun- 
try will accrue to that country’s own producers. 
Second, the location of the strategic effects are quite sensitive to the values 
of c,  chosen in the calibration. The assumption that the base is an equilibrium 
gave us a range of values from which to choose c,  for each producer, but the 
actual choice was arbitrary. The location of the  strategic effects is therefore 
sensitive to an aspect of model specification on which we are ill informed. 
Finally, even if we were to pretend that VW is a French firm,  table 3.6  makes 
no case for a French  VER as a strategic trade policy. The changes in model 
numbers as the Japanese producers contract and VW expands reduces the cost 
of the VER to French consumers from 2,000 million ECU per year to 1,900, 
but it raises the effect on VW’s profits only from 57 to  147 million ECU, and 
all of the profit gains are still far short of the losses to consumers. 
3.6  Conclusions 
When numerically calibrated models are used to analyze economic policy, 
data are used only to calibrate and not to test the model. Thus much depends 
on the prior specification of the model, and it is not clear how much confidence 
one should have in the detailed results. At best, the numerical results presented 
in this paper should be taken as illustrations of possible orders of magnitude 
associated with the effects discussed in the theoretical  model rather than as 
precise numerical predictions. 
Concern about sensitivity to prior specification and to the parameter values 
used in the calibration can be fully allayed by very systematic sensitivity analy- 
sis. I have not conducted a systematic sensitivity analysis with respect to model 
specification, but  we have  seen that  the general  nature of  the results is not 
greatly altered by changing the crucial assumption about whether firms’ model 
numbers are exogenous or endogenous.  I have undertaken  only very limited 
sensitivity analysis with respect to model parameters. The details are not re- 
ported here, but  again the conclusion  is that the general shape of the result 
remains unchanged as parameter values change. 
However, one crucial aspect of the results discussed in this paper does de- 
pend on model specification: how firms’ model numbers change in response 
to policy changes turns out to be very sensitive to the “cost per model” parame- 
ter in firms’ cost functions. Thus both the location and the very existence of 
the “strategic trade policy” effects in this model depend sensitively on a model- 
ing choice that has to be made with a degree of arbitrariness at the calibration 
stage. 
Even leaving aside the issue of  sensitivity, the results presented  here cast 81  Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market 
doubt on the case for strategic trade policy. The effects on increased competi- 
tion among “home” firms may wipe out the expected benefits of a strengthened 
strategic position in competition with “foreign” firms. In a many-country world 
with multilateral trade  flows, the beneficiary  of  one country’s strategic trade 
policy may be another country’s producer. Finally, in the cases discussed in 
this paper, the “strategic”  effects of trade policy are greatly outweighed by 
more traditional effects. 
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Comment  James Levinsohn 
The European car market is complex. There are several European producers, 
a few big American players producing in Europe, and of course Japanese im- 
ports. The menu of plausible trade policies to be investigated is long and also 
complex. For example, quotas on Japanese imports might be set individually 
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for each European country, or there might be a quota on total European imports 
from Japan. The quota might be in value terms, or it might be in terms of 
physical  units.  Many European  countries  have  very  disparate  domestic  tax 
structures that in effect act as trade barriers. These seemingly domestic policies 
are also candidates for trade policy reform in the European automobile market. 
In short, modeling trade policy for the European car market is tricky business. 
Alasdair Smith does a very admirable job coming up with answers to some 
very relevant and very hard questions. 
There are many standards by which the results of this paper might be judged. 
The most compelling of these, though, is to ask how one could improve on the 
paper  conditional  on having  to actually  come  up with answers.  There  are 
plenty of detailed econometric methodologies to estimate demand and oligop- 
oly pricing in the automobile market. Could these methodologies be readily 
applied to a market characterized by the many countries and potential policies 
in the European market? Probably not. When the questions addressed become 
as complex as those Smith poses in this paper, empirical effects are unlikely 
to get beyond the simulation methodology. 
I would like to address two issues in the remainder of my comments. First, if 
the complexity of the issues addressed forces the researcher to use a simulation 
methodology, are there margins on which  to improve?  Second, even in the 
perfect simulation model, how much trust should we place in the results? 
Smith is one of the pioneers in modeling trade policies with imperfect com- 
petition. Our search for margins on which to improve is brief  since the job is 
done right. There are, though, two possible improvements. First, many of the 
policies that are analyzed in the paper are related to the broad changes associ- 
ated with  1992. Pan-European quotas are an example. The policies associated 
with  1992 are not likely to come as surprises. By 1992, only economists with 
good memories will remember how many “1992” conferences they attended 
in the four years preceding  that date. When broad changes in the economic 
environment are expected far in advance, thinking firms will act to preclude 
adverse effects that the changes might bring. Japanese auto firms are no excep- 
tion, and modeling preemptive behavior in the simulation model would be nice. 
Specifically, direct foreign investment by Japanese firms in Europe is important 
and might be profitably added to the model. This is especially so if, as in the 
United  States,  Japanese  production  via  direct  foreign  investment  does  not 
count against any quota. Also, if a quota is to be based on the prequota market 
share, predatory pricing becomes an important consideration. This entails an 
increase in European consumer surplus that, it seems, could be important when 
analyzing the welfare effects of policies. 
Second, the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function seems a strange approach to mod- 
eling automobile demand. While it provides  a nice representation of  prefer- 
ences when confronted with a menu at a Chinese restaurant, the love-of-variety 
approach is probably not appropriate to modeling the demand for automobiles. 
Rather, the Lancasterian  approach in which consumers buy  one unit  of  the 83  Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market 
good and choose the unit nearest their ideal variety seems more appropriate. 
The demand and oligopoly-pricing equations that fall out of this approach are 
admittedly  more complicated than those  of  the Dixit-Stiglitz  approach,  but 
since the model is simulated instead of estimated, this problem is not insur- 
mountable. 
Smith’s simulation model is very complete and carefully constructed. Sup- 
pose he were to somehow also adopt a Lancasterian approach while simultane- 
ously  modeling  the  model-firm  behavior  resulting  from the  expectation  of 
1992. How much trust should we place in the answers that this model would 
provide? Put another way, what can we learn from even the very best that the 
simulation methodology has to offer? Here I am skeptical about the marginal 
product of simulation studies. My reasons are twofold. 
The inputs to the simulation model-elasticities,  costs, as well as other pa- 
rameters  estimated  elsewhere-have  standard  errors associated  with  them. 
When the inputs to the simulation model have standard errors, so should the 
outputs. The multiplicative nature of probabilities is such that even if we are 
reasonably confident about the point estimates of several inputs, the solutions 
to the simulation model will often have, by econometric standards, huge stan- 
dard errors. Varying one parameter at a time and re-solving the model for each 
parameter value, as is often done in sensitivity analysis for simulation models, 
is not enough. If the solutions of simulation models are to be credible, standard 
errors should accompany the solution values. 
If the above reason for some healthy skepticism is basically a statistical ar- 
gument, the other cause of  skepticism is an economic story. Myriad  recent 
theoretical  papers have investigated how  trade policy  works in imperfectly 
competitive markets. A key lesson that has been learned is that the effects of a 
given trade policy frequently hinge critically on firms’ modes of market con- 
duct. This is troubling since the mode of market conduct is seldom observable. 
The policies investigated by Smith in this paper are also sensitive to market 
conduct. In this case, Cournot behavior is assumed. Since signs, not just mag- 
nitudes, of the effects of policy often depend on the mode of market conduct, 
it would be nice to see reference to some estimates of the mode of conduct in 
the European auto industry. If such estimates do not already exist, this is one 
parameter that especially seems worth estimating. 
The bottom line is that once we constrain ourselves to coming up with an- 
swers to very complex questions (in a reasonable amount of time), we perhaps 
lock ourselves into a methodology which will not allow terribly precise esti- 
mates. An alternative is to ask simpler questions and get more precise answers. 
This trade-off is a judgment call. Having decided on asking the big-picture 
questions, Smith does a very nice job coming up with the best answers that his 
methodology will allow. This Page Intentionally Left Blank